ART AND MORALITY:
THE RELATION BETWEEN ART AND MORAL CONCERN
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Can we claim a relation between art and morality by claiming that art is able to provoke moral concern? In questioning the possibility of art creating an inner transformation within its spectator, I am wondering whether art is able to create awareness of life, and therefore awareness of the possibility of living a life with moral awareness. After consideration, I will then claim the possibility of being a spectator in art, and becoming a practitioner of moral life.

1 INTRODUCTION

As an artist I was wondering if I am able to make the viewer of my artwork aware of the moral ideas hidden behind my work. By my paintings ‘Together Alone’ I was putting in doubt ideals carried by society like individualism and materialism. The children I painted are searching for contact with the spectator and in this contact questions can arise about the spectator’s own childhood, about childhood in general or it might evoke a feeling about the children of the future. An inner conversation or an inner confrontation can take place, by the piece of art that is in itself not able to speak. In its silence questions can arise which cast doubt on the feelings, the thoughts and the behavior of the spectator. In my perspective; it is by art that we can question our own way of life and as an artist I feel free to play with this. But the question that remains; Is art able to create this questioning? And if it is, will the spectator be able to find an answer in the questioning I created with my work?

As an philosopher I was wondering if it is true that people who are sensitive to the beauty of art are also sensitive to the ethical questions of moral life. As a philosopher I was wondering if it is possible to claim the moral dimension of art as a fundamental and important dimension. I was wondering whether you could value a life, lived by strong moral beliefs, by its aesthetical dimension. In other words, I was wondering if we can draw a line between ethics and aesthetics in wondering whether we could speak of a relation, a crossover or an interaction between the experience of art and our participation in moral life. So, can you claim that the inner conversation created by art will lead to moral awareness within its spectator?
The main question ‘If we can claim this relation between art and morality’ I would like to answer by referring to Michael Tanner and Colin Lyas. By the work of Michael Tanner ‘Ethics and Aesthetics are -?’ I propose to question if there’s a similarity in the way we make a moral judgment and an aesthetic judgment. His ‘acquaintance thesis’ will give insight into the relation between art and morality. And an interesting turn in his theory will take place when the borders fade and ethics and aesthetics become one: the so called ‘aestheticization of morality’. By referring to the work of Colin Lyas ‘Art, expression and morality’ I will question whether an artistic experience can cause an inner transformation within the spectator resulting in the arising of moral awareness. His ‘concept of expression’ will give insight in both moral and artistic experiences. Inspired by Nietzsche, you can detect an attractiveness in his work by his concern of morality and his beliefs in the solving capacity of art. In both cases, by answering the question ‘if we can claim this relation between art and morality’ Tanner and Lyas will evoke further questions, such as; what exactly do we mean when we talk about ‘art’ or ‘morality’ and in which way can we claim this ‘moral dimension of art’ and ‘aesthetic dimension of moral life’?

To avoid misunderstanding; these questions will not be answerable with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. These questions are already answered by very different views in philosophy and therefore explained by very different positions; the ethicist (will claim that when the ethical value of a work of art increases, so will the aesthetical value), the contextualists (will claim that aesthetic value can be based on the ethical value or the ethical disvalue and is therefore dependent of its context) and the autonomist (will claim that the ethical values are irrelevant to genuinely aesthetic appreciation of artworks). For me it will be the challenge to search for a kind of framework behind their ideas. Therefore I am searching for the conditions of possibility for claiming a relation between art and ethics. Without a doubt there will be critics on every point I’m claiming, but that will be the challenge of the outcome. And I would expect you will understand that, given my double involvement; because I am writing as a philosopher but involved as an artist, my outcome will be positive.

3 Different positions about the relation between art and ethics were pointed out in the article ‘values of art and the ethical question’ written by; Lillehammer, H. (2008) in the British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 48 No. 4, pp. 376-394.
4 Different claims are made in different articles; in ‘values of art and the ethical question’ written by; Lillehammer, H. (2008) in the British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 48 No. 4, pp. 376-394 and the article; ‘Art and Ethical Criticism: an overview of recent directions of research’ written by Noel, C. (2000) *Ethics*, vol. 110, no 2, pp. 350-387 I found; conceptual claims, normative claims, substantial claims, descriptive, metaphysical and instrumental claims. Each claim knows its own possibilities en impossibilities, each position holds its own boundaries.
THE RELATION BETWEEN AESTHETIC JUDGEMENTS AND MORAL JUDGEMENTS

‘Philosophers concerned with aesthetics have frequently discussed the nature of the judgments that we make about art, the types of reason upon which they rest and the ways in which they might be justified. In considering the role of ethical considerations in thinking about art, a useful place to begin is with the relation between aesthetic and moral judgments’.5

2.1 The acquaintance thesis

Michael Tanner writes about the relation between art and aesthetics when it comes to our way of judging, in his article Ethics and Aesthetics are -?6. Tanner explores the suggestion that understanding aesthetic judgments requires first-hand acquaintance with the work being judged. What he defines as the ‘acquaintance thesis’7; a thesis which is closely grounded with the principles that aesthetic judgments (which we define as principles of taste) are not grounded in general principles (which we know as universal laws) from which particular judgments can be derived. While; ‘Many of the central concepts featuring in aesthetical judgments can only be ‘filled in’ by attention of specific features of the work of art, with this experience providing the ultimate justification of those judgments’.8

The acquaintance thesis explain to us a difference between the judgments we make on moral ground and aesthetic ground; ‘judgments of aesthetic value, unlike judgments of moral value, must be based on first-hand experience of their objects and are not, except within very narrow limits, transmissible from one person to another’.9 So, our theories of aesthetics are initially based on our experience, on our interaction with the work of art; on our ‘acquaintance’. From a human perspective it is nearly impossible to claim the untruth of his position; how can you value the ‘N.1’ from Jackson Pollock, if you have never noticed the painting? How can you speak of the beauty of ‘ the 40th symphony’ of Mozart, if you have never heard it? From a philosophical point of view, on the other hand, without a doubt, there are positions that claim that there is a certain way to come to a universal-law about the trueness in values of art. So first

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5 Bermudez, J.L. and Gardner, S about Tanner, M. and his theory in the introduction of Art and Morality (2003) p. 1
7 His suggestion for the ‘acquaintance thesis’ is originally made by F. Sibley, M. Mothersill, and R. Wolheim. Tanner refers to their work in his essay: Ethics and Aesthetics are-? Art and Morality, pp. 24-25.
8 Here I quote Tanner, M. (2003). Ethics and Aesthetics are-? Art and Morality, pp. 21
let’s take a closer look at how Tanner defends his distinction between ethical and aesthetical judgments.

### 2.2 The Aesthetical judgment versus the Moral judgment

In the ‘Acquaintance-thesis’ of Tanner the difference between aesthetical judgments and moral judgment becomes clear. While there is a necessity of a first-person experience for an aesthetic judgment, when it comes to ethics we are used to claim our moral truths as universal truths. For example; we can speak about the ethical conditions -in its possibilities or impossibilities- when it comes to murder, without the necessity of witnessing a murder first-hand. When it comes to an ethical judgment we can understand these judgments because they are based on general principles that we are able to question or to justify, by appealing to our rational capacities and abilities.

This distinction between our moral judgments and our aesthetic judgments would be clarified by Tanner by referring to our philosophical attitudes when it comes to ethics and art; ‘most philosopher in Ethics justify themselves by such general principles, by making Ethics and moral behavior understandable and transparent’, while many -if not even more- ‘philosophers suspect or claim the impossibility to come to an aesthetic evaluation based on general principles’. In other words, when we ask Tanner about the biggest difference between art and morality, he would say; morality can be taught (by a universal position) and art has to be experienced (on a personal position).

To define the differences in another way, Tanner postulates a kind of asymmetry in aesthetical judgments and moral judgments by describing the ethical judgments as judging the ‘the mundane’ and the aesthetical judgments as judging ‘the exceptional’. In his own words he clarifies this difference: ‘Whereas in aesthetic our interest lies primarily with the exceptional [with works of art that have a claim of greatness], in ethics the concern is frequently with the mundane [with forms of behavior whose regulation is essential for social existence’]. But, this distinction, between justifying the mundane and the exceptional, makes me wonder if our conception of moral judgments transformed into general principles are indeed completely justifiable and legitimate grounded on mundane convictions? It makes me wonder if it’s true that moral judgments can always be explained by its general principles? So, can we justify this

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11 Tanner comes to his distinction between the mundane and the exceptional in *Ethics and Aesthetics are-?*, pp.24
12 In ‘Art and Morality’, J.B. Bermudez and S. Gardner describe Tanner’s position this way; *Art and Morality*, p.2.
differences between moral judgments and aesthetical judgment, or can we discover some similarities in our attitude when it comes to judging ethics and aesthetics?

If it would be justifiable that our moral principles are qualified on basis of ‘being mundane’, wouldn’t there be less differences in ethical perspectives? Or is it possible to speak of an personal preference for an ethical position, and therefore a personal and aesthetical attitude when it comes to these general principles in moral judgments? In this way, wouldn’t you agree that the call for symmetry between the ethical and aesthetical judgments is also justified? Par example; you can call it a ‘general principle’ in ethics that it’s not right to kill. You can claim this principle on universal and mundane convictions. But as a moral agent, it is possible to base this principle on your personal motivation (based on autonomy) or on the law constituted by the State (based on heteronomy or authority). Besides, this personal motivation can be grounded on very different beliefs. So is it possible that these ethical motivations are based on a moral belief justified by deontological thinking (based on the fundamental convictions about doing the right thing), by utilitarian convictions (based on the best outcomes caused by your action defined by its utility) or by the reasoning of the virtue ethics (based on being a good person with a virtuous character). Now, are you sure that these different personal motivations doesn’t undermine your general mundane ethical principles?

2.3 The Aestheticization of Morality

Couldn’t it be true that in a way, based on the acquaintance principle, an ethical judgment is more likely to be in accordance with a moral judgment? You would be led to think, if the acquaintance thesis is really a fruitful theory, it would be possible to apply this to our vision of ethical beliefs and judgments.

Tanner himself suggests that his ‘acquaintance thesis’ could, as well, be applied to our moral judgments. He suggests that when it’s true that the acquaintance-principle operates for aesthetic properties in general, it may then, also works for the ethical properties. This is what Garner appoints the: ‘aestheticization of morality’ in Tanners ideas of Ethics and Aesthetics; ‘Perhaps Tanner suggests, the acquaintance thesis ceases to apply when we move beyond the morally mundane to a form of ethical thinking in which what is being judged is not whether actions fall under general principles, and how those principles might be grounded, but rather the

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13 With my notion for ‘symmetry’ I suggest a quest for similarity between the ethical and the aesthetical judgment. This suggestion will be called into possibility later on in the Tanners article.

14 Tanner makes the distinction between autonomy and authority on p.22 in his essay Ethics and Aesthetics are-? and defines the differences between the ‘legal man’, the ‘moral man’ and the ‘aesthetic man’ on p.23, to make clear that each holds different reasons and beliefs to act morally just.
attraction of a particular way of living one’s life and the value of transforming one’s life in that direction.”\textsuperscript{15}

From my point of view this is a very interesting turn in his theory for three reasons. In the first place; it shows the relation between thinking about art and morality. When it comes to their similarity; they are both based on personal experience, caused by acquaintances (by perception when it comes to art or by imagination when it comes to ethics). In this way they are both grounded on our personal convictions; they are grounded on our moral beliefs and desires, they are grounded on our vision based on our ‘being in the world’. But be aware; by saying this, I am not claiming that therefore it is otiose to think of moral judgments by their universal and mundane capacities in claiming the truth of ethics.

In the second place his argument is very fruitful because it indicates the importance of art. ’One way in which works of art can contribute to moral thinking is by portraying the different ideals for the lived life in a way that offers the form of acquaintance with them required if they are to be judged, compared and perhaps even adopted’.\textsuperscript{16} Art creates the condition of possibility for us, to be able to be related to one’s own life. And last but not least; to meet, to respond and to satisfy my biggest opponents -or enemies- in the philosophy’s thought about the relation between ethics and art; Tanner postulate his convictions with appropriate modesty. While he is convinced of the case for the acquaintance principle in respect to works of art, where they seems unimpugnable, the case for it in morality does not\textsuperscript{17};

’Though the claims I am making in aesthetics have universal validity, I don’t think that applies to my claims vis-à-vis morality; though my own view of morality is that someone who doesn’t assent to them will have an impoverished moral life. But the very idea of taking an embodied ideal, or selecting from several – an inspirational view of morality - may be deeply repugnant to many people’.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} The ’aestheticization is a term used by Gardner written in his introduction when he applies to Tanner’s thesis of acquaintance ; Bermudez, J.L. and Gardner, S about Tanner, \textit{Art and Morality} (2003) p. 2
\textsuperscript{17} Tanner, M. (2003). \textit{Ethics and Aesthetics are-?} Art and Morality, pp. 33
\textsuperscript{18} Tanner, M. (2003). \textit{Ethics and Aesthetics are-?} Art and Morality, pp. 33
3 THE RELATION BETWEEN ART AND INNER TRANSFORMATIONS

‘While there are compelling reasons for thinking that there is ‘something up’ with morality in modern age, our understanding of why this should be so - of what it is exactly that is rotten in the state of morality - remains poor. (…) The theme of discontent concerning morality joins with that of the transformative power of art, and the question is, how we may suppose that art is capable of effecting the kind of deep inner transformation that some, like Nietzsche, have sought to find in it’.19

3.1 ‘There’s something up’ with Morality

Colin Lyas starts his article ‘Art, expression and reality’ with expressing his concerns when it comes to moral philosophy nowadays. And this concerns has to be clear before explaining his theory about the relation between art and reality; in its ability to transfer and evoke an expression. With his concerns about moral philosophy he reminds us to Nietzsche and his skeptical position when it comes to morality;

‘English moral philosophy, with a few honourable exceptions, offers the gloomy spectacle of a danse macabre, in which the personnel of the familiar triangle of deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics come, in an ethical reference, successively centre stage, remaining there with all the stability and conviction of post-war French governments. (…) Something, Nietzsche remarked, is up with morality, but one searches in vain the bulk of Anglophone moral philosophy for any sustained engagement with that possibility’.20

‘There is something up with morality’ Nietzsche claims. To add to this, ‘there is something wrong with English moral philosophy’ Lyas says, mentioning its inability to help us understand our actual moral reality. Both convinced of a problem; the gap between theory and practice. In a way Lyas claims because of this problem and in its gap, the possibilities arise for the arts, in a way that Nietzsche claimed for an artistic revaluation21 And I cannot hide my sense of connectedness with his position (although I am not likely the type of Nietzschean partisan when it comes to his philosophy).

21 Janaway, C. wrote the article in Art and Morality (2003) ‘Nietzsche’s artistic revaluation’ p. 261-276 about Nietzsche and his hope for change caused by the arts.
3.2 The possibilities of Art by the concept of expression

In some ways, the disquiet regarding morality can result in a strong attraction to art. Lyas is searching for a fundament for the arts in the aim of evoking (in saving and creating) the appropriate moral concern.\(^{22}\) In this way we can discuss the possibilities of art in its capability of effecting deep inner transformations that some philosophers like Nietzsche have sought to find in it. The question is; how we are to suppose that art is capable of this? Lyas reacts to this question with the suggestion that we can find the answer in a concept central to modern aesthetics nowadays; the ‘concept of expression’.\(^{23}\) He founds this concept of expression on the theory of B. Crose’s *The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General* (1992) which aim it was to offer a general way of understanding ‘how philosophical and artistic interest may converge’.\(^{24}\) Crose describes an ‘expression’ as a ‘sense-making activity’; in which philosophy and art share their interests. But what counts as an artistic expression?

In clarifying his definition of the ‘concept of expressing’ Lyas refers to H.P. Grice who defined a difference between the expression in its natural and a non-natural meaning.\(^{25}\) In the case of the natural meaning; you are in the grip of emotion while in the case of the non-natural-meaning; the emotion is in your grip, and then we speak of art. By example; in the first case I am in the grip of anger or sadness, while in the second case (when it comes to art) I am able to relate to this anger or sadness and translate it into a piece of art. But what exactly should count as art according to Lyas? A question which is answered in very different ways by very different positions. But Lyas answers, without claiming a normative dimension (about what is good art and what is bad) that; ‘we should treat all activities of expression as art, as the manifold ways by which we make sense of the world’.\(^{26}\) And he adds; ‘let us make a start with the claim that works of art can be the place where, in ways complicated related to artistic greatness, serious thinking about central concerns of human life can go’.\(^{27}\)

Lyas is convinced that this concept of expression’ drawn by Crose, needs further explanation and therefore he reacts to the comparison between art and philosophy. Their similarity and their importance is mentioned in their ability to create a world of its own, with its own values. Referring to Tanner’s writing about the philosophy of Nietzsche and the music of


Wagner we see there is a common aim in creating a world different than the one we already became familiar with.\textsuperscript{28} Both philosophy and art can show us what it would be like to live in a radically different set of values\textsuperscript{29}. But unlike the philosopher who can only claim this possibility of a different set of values, the artist can make us experience `what it actually feels like` to live in this different set of values. I quote Lyas about the difference in art and philosophy on the one hand, and about the important relation between art and its `philosophy of life` on the other end of scale:

`Wagner can make us feel what it would be like to live with a radically different set of values. Schopenhauer may tell us that something is the case, but there is also the question of what, in detail, it would be like were that true. This is a matter of bringing out imaginatively the lived implications of a philosophical view, and only an imaginative work of art seems able to do that.`\textsuperscript{30}

### 3.3 The possibilities of Art in creating an inner transformation

With the concept of expression, Lyas claims a possibility for the arts in creating an inner transformation in showing us what it is like to live in a world suggested by the artist. A world which might be distinctive from the one we actually live in and in that way art can be a critical practitioner of our moral beliefs in society nowadays. In its possibility to evoke a critical view, and create an expression, Lyas claims that art can cause an inner transformation in our experience of reality. A transformation which is more likely to take place by the experience of an artwork than reading a book of philosophy, because of the demandingness of art’s imaginative power.

`Both the critical understanding of our condition and the potential for transforming it are contained in the depths of the work of art, and they are made available to us in a mode that is equipped to stimulate and facilitate self-transformation, that is, in artistically rather than trough self-consciously philosophical reflection`.\textsuperscript{31}

Lyas claims that art is equipped to stimulate and facilitate `self-transformation` and at this point of `the possibility of the transformation of the self`, he must foresee big critics of (at least) four different positions: (1) the philosophers of mind and neuroscientist can claim that our notion of

\textsuperscript{28} Lyas, C. refers to different articles written by Tanner, including the article `Sentimentality` publicized in `Art and Morality`(2003) by Gardner, S. and J.B. Bermudez.

\textsuperscript{29} Lyas, C. (2003). Art, expression and morality. \textit{Art and Morality}, pp. 286


\textsuperscript{31} Bermudez, J.L. and Gardner, S. about Tanner and his theory in the introduction of \textit{Art and Morality} (2003) p. 17
the ‘self’ can be called into doubt and therefore the notion of the inner transformation loses its power of expression\textsuperscript{32}. (2) The psychologist that claims that within the theory of an experience of a new set of values we are asked to ‘suspend our idea of the self’ to be receptive to a new version of the self, but in reality we are not able to permit or accept such a suspension\textsuperscript{33}. (3) The philosopher that claims that this ‘inner transformation’ that art should evoke, is not open for all of us; seeing that simply not everyone is susceptible to the transformative power of art\textsuperscript{34}. And last but not least; (4) the philosopher that reminds us -although they recognize the power of art in creating a different set of values for life- that we are not solipsists in creating ‘a world of our own’ but real social human beings surrounded by a social and cultural environment, which isn’t changing that easily.\textsuperscript{35}

Briefly I will react to these critics in defending Lyas’s position (without devoting too much in respect of the aim of my paper). In response to the critics (1) and (2) I would answer; whether it is scientifically proven or explained or not, we can experience an inner transformation by reading a book, listening to a new song or perceiving a piece of art. This experience is claimed on our notion of the self as an ‘autobiographic self’\textsuperscript{36}, which means that although our ‘hardcore scientific notion of the self’ in not really in change, our experience of our self as the ‘autobiographical self’ can be affected, and is therefore (without a question) in change. In responding to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} critic; I think both Lyas and I, are not claiming that this possibility of art will work out for everybody; it might depend on ‘the kind of person one is’.\textsuperscript{37} Without a doubt, the inner transformation by being ‘affected’ or being ‘brought into motion’ by a piece of art, is hardly possible for the person whose eyes are closed in perceiving the world around him, for the person whose ears are covered in experiencing his surrounding, or the person who is not capable or willing to read. Therefore, in my research on the relation between art and moral concern regarding the inner transformative power of art and its ability to create new moral views and

\textsuperscript{32} Here I refer to a philosopher of mind like Metzinger who claims that our belief of a ‘self’ is an hallucination; ‘no such thing as selves exist in our world’. In Metzinger, T.(2005), ‘Précis: Being No One’, Psyche 11 (5)

\textsuperscript{33} Lyas mentioned the critics on the idea of ‘the suspension of the self’ on p.283 ‘Art, expression and morality’ published in Art and Morality, p. 283

\textsuperscript{34} In ‘Art and moral education’ written by Hamilhton, C. the possibility of art in creating moral awareness by education is questioned, well it might not be the case for everyone, it might depend on ‘the kind of person one is’

\textsuperscript{35} Lyas brings up this objection in his article Art, expression and morality (2003) In Art and Morality, pp. 292-293

\textsuperscript{36} This point is made by Lyas himself in article Art, expression and morality (2003) In Art and Morality, pp. P.283 and is also argued as a critics on Metzinger pointed out by Damasio in his writing about the ‘autobiographical self’ that exist near the ‘core-self’ and the ‘proto-self’ in; Damasio, Antonio (1999), ‘The Feeling of What Happens. Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, San Diego/New York/London, Harcourt

\textsuperscript{37} The argument of ‘The kind of person one is’ is given by Hamilトン, C. (2003) in his essay ‘Art and moral education’ published in Art and Morality, pp. 42; ‘What one makes of art and whether it is relevant to one’s moral experience and, if so, in what way, depends a great deal upon the kind of person one is’.
beliefs, there has to be some modesty in claiming it’s not always the case for all, but it can be the case for some and therefore it is a significant feature of art.

For those who are sensitive to the expressive power of art, it’s possible to achieve an inner transformation which can create an achieving in the fullness of life and which might transform reality. Although it must be very hard to transform the world outside us, as a permissive reaction to (4), it might be a little easier to start with one’s own ‘inner world’. And whether it’s possible to really change that world outside or not, remains a question even Nietzsche was aware of in admitting the difficulties or impossibilities of realization;

“What he [Nietzsche] seems to dislike is every aspect of contemporary civilization. His underlying view that if we do not make a drastically new start we are doomed, since we are living in the wreckage of two thousand and more years of fundamentally mistaken ideas about everything that matters (...) offers carte blanche to people who fancy the idea of a clean break with their whole cultural inheritance. Nietzsche was under no illusions about the impossibility of such a schism”.38

4 CONCLUSION

I started this paper with the question ‘if we could claim a relation between art and moral concern’. In answering this question by referring to Tanner and Lyas I found a foundation in claiming there is a relation between the experience of art and the practice of our own moral life, in the capability of art in questioning its spectator in his or her way of living. In this way, art creates the condition of possibility for us, to be able to be related to one’s own life

According to Tanner and his ‘acquaintance principle’ it’s very fruitful to take a look at the similarities of how we come to an moral- and an aesthetical judgment. Tanner claims that an aesthetic judgment can only be based on our personal acquaintance; based on our experience of the work of art. In ethics it’s common to speak of morality in terms of its universal demandingness, but Tanner shows that in a way, moral judgments are based on this ‘acquaintance principle’ as well and therefore based on our personal experience of being a practitioner of moral life. Tanner claims for the autonomy of its moral practitioners in a way as he speaks of the so called ‘aestheticization of morality’, which shows us that the borders between ethics and aesthetics are not so strictly as they might occur in the first place; when the borders

38 Lyas, C. (2003) Art, expression and morality. In; Art and Morality, on pp. 291 by referring to Tanner’s writing about Wagner and Nietzsche.
fade and ethics and aesthetics become one, a person can live ‘his own ‘philosophy of life’. And it will not be a coincidence that lots of ethicists, by their normative and metaphysical demandingness, seem to forget this personal human experience in living a life by their own experiences, beliefs and motivations, caused by ‘the kind of person one is’, and therefore our convictions of morality (as our taste of art) may be different for different kind of people.

Referring to Nietzsche, Lyas shows us the possibility of art in causing ‘inner transformations’ by its possibility of expression (as ‘a sense-making activity). Lyas makes us aware of the reflective and critical character of art and its ability of causing, or eliciting a deep inner reflection of this reality and create ‘new possible worlds’. Therefore Lyas points us to the possibility that our moral world and our moral beliefs are not solid but in motion; changed by each experience or each inner insight. And art is able to create these changes by its ability to create an inner conversation within the spectator which may lead to an inner transformation because of the ability of changing our moral reality in its end. By referring to Lyas we can claim that the experience of art can change our world in reality, although, as even Nietzsche admits, it will not be an easy transformation, it is transformable; for those who are sensitive to the expressive power of art, it’s possible to achieve an inner transformation which can create an achievement in the fullness of life and which might even transform reality.

In this way, writing about the relation between art and ethics made me wiser on both disciplines. When it comes to art I found a foundation for claiming the importance of it in its reflective character and its possibility of creating a deeper understanding of life. Art can be the mediator in reflection when it comes to our way of life; our moral beliefs and our desires. Art can be a mirror of our soul in questioning the things that would otherwise be left unquestioned. Art is able to make us feel as if we live with a radically different set of values and therefore it is able to create moral concern or awareness in questioning our moral convictions. In a way we claim an interaction of art and its spectator (in finding the true meaning of the work of art), and in the same way, I suggest, we should claim, and admit, an interaction between morality and the life lived, and art is in the position to fulfill this interaction. And seeing that we claim that there is not one interpretation of art, I suggest we dare to admit that there ought not to be and there is not, one interpretation of morality either. It is very philosophical to create boundaries and restrictions for art the name of morality, but it is even more artistic to deny and to fight against these restrictions and boundaries…. in the name of morality.
5 LITERATURE


